Negotiations between ASEAN and China over a regional code of conduct for the South China Sea have reached a critical juncture, with both sides expressing optimism about concluding a landmark agreement within months. Philippine Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro articulated this position during remarks at the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Manila, signalling that the bloc and Beijing remain committed to finalising the accord before the calendar flips to 2025. The announcement comes amid persistent tensions in the disputed waters, where overlapping territorial claims have repeatedly tested the region's diplomatic resolve.
Lazaro underscored the political commitment underpinning current efforts, noting that monthlong in-person meetings among negotiators have accelerated the pace of deliberations. She characterised the atmosphere as one where participating nations—both within ASEAN and from major power stakeholders including the United States, Australia, and Japan—display genuine willingness to bridge remaining gaps. This convergence of intent, visible at the foreign ministers' gathering, suggests that the momentum behind the negotiations has shifted positively compared to earlier phases of discussion that stretched across previous years.
The code of conduct framework addresses one of Southeast Asia's most complex geopolitical challenges. Since China and ASEAN members signed the non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, efforts to convert this political framework into a legally binding document have advanced fitfully. The current push represents perhaps the most serious attempt yet to formalise rules governing maritime behaviour in waters that carry enormous strategic and economic significance for the region. Success would establish mechanisms for managing disputes and preventing miscalculation among rival claimants.
Four substantive issues continue to occupy negotiators as they work toward a final text. The first concerns how the new code of conduct relates to and builds upon the 2002 Declaration of Conduct—essentially determining whether the new agreement supplements or supersedes earlier understandings. The second pivotal question addresses the legal character of any final agreement: whether it should carry binding force under international law or remain a non-binding political commitment. This distinction carries profound implications for enforcement mechanisms and the obligations it imposes on signatories.
Geographical scope represents another critical dimension under discussion. Negotiators must clarify precisely which waters the code applies to and establish clear definitions for maritime features and their respective zones of jurisdiction. This spatial delineation directly affects which claimant states bear responsibility for conduct in specific areas and how overlapping claims are managed. The fourth key milestone involves defining terms that form the code's operational foundation—particularly the concept of self-restraint, a notion central to managing competitive interests without escalating toward confrontation.
Progress on terminology illustrates the incremental nature of these talks. Lazaro highlighted that negotiators have developed growing consensus around defining self-restraint, a term that sounds straightforward but carries different implications depending on context and interpretation. When major powers disagree on what restraint means in practice, establishing shared understanding becomes essential. The fact that such definitional consensus is emerging, she suggested, demonstrates that the negotiating process is generating tangible results rather than simply circling familiar disagreements.
The involvement of distant powers like the United States, Australia, and Japan at the Manila meeting underscores the broader geopolitical significance of South China Sea arrangements. These countries, while not direct claimants, maintain substantial interests in freedom of navigation and regional stability. Their presence in diplomatic forums signals that any code of conduct must satisfy not only immediate disputants but also the security concerns of nations that depend on unimpeded maritime commerce through these waters. The convergence of American, Australian, Japanese, Chinese, and ASEAN perspectives—however fragile—reflects recognition that creating workable rules serves everyone's interests better than allowing tensions to fester.
The 2024 timeline deserves particular attention given previous delays that have characterised these negotiations. Earlier target dates have slipped, sometimes for months, as fundamental disagreements resurfaced or new incidents in the South China Sea complicated diplomatic momentum. The fact that both ASEAN and China are publicly committing to a year-end deadline suggests they have calculated that delaying further risks allowing accumulated grievances and military incidents to overwhelm diplomatic channels. For Malaysia and other ASEAN members, the success or failure of these talks carries direct consequences for their own maritime interests and security environments.
The practical implications of concluding a code of conduct extend well beyond the negotiating table. A robust agreement could establish mechanisms for maritime incidents, including protocols for communication between military forces, procedures for managing accidents, and frameworks for peaceful dispute resolution. It might also create space for dialogue on marine environmental protection and resource management—areas where cooperation could supplement security arrangements. For the broader Indo-Pacific region, a successful South China Sea code could serve as a template for managing similar territorial and maritime disputes elsewhere.
However, scepticism about the negotiations remains warranted. Previous attempts to establish binding agreements have foundered on fundamentally opposed national interests. The Philippines and Vietnam, both ASEAN members with significant territorial claims, have viewed some proposals as insufficiently protective of their positions. Meanwhile, China's approach has sometimes appeared designed more to constrain others' activities than to genuinely limit its own actions. Finding language that genuinely constrains all parties while remaining acceptable to China presents a structural challenge that optimistic rhetoric cannot entirely mask.
The coming months will test whether the reported progress translates into a viable final text. Negotiators must navigate between demands from claimant states seeking to protect their territorial interests and Beijing's preference for arrangements that do not fundamentally alter the status quo. For Malaysia, which has substantial but somewhat secondary claims in the South China Sea, the negotiations represent an opportunity to secure a framework that restrains more powerful actors without undermining Malaysian interests or regional stability.
