The entire process authorising Lembaga Tabung Haji's acquisition of a 30 per cent shareholding in Putrajaya Perdana Bhd took place during a period when the construction firm remained under the influence of Low Taek Jho, according to testimony presented in Parliament during deliberations on a Royal Commission of Inquiry report into the pilgrim fund's management. Finance Minister II Datuk Seri Amir Hamzah Azizan disclosed this timeline to lawmakers on August 11, drawing from sworn evidence given during the SRC International case, which had examined financial flows connected to the fugitive financier.
Court testimony from Putrajaya Perdana director Datuk Rosman Abdullah established that between July and August 2014, approximately RM170 million was channelled from SRC International into Putra Perdana Construction, a subsidiary of Putrajaya Perdana, across three separate payments. This funding arrangement occurred within a critical window: the company remained under Jho Low's operational control through his vehicle, Utama Banking Group Bhd, until the formal sale and purchase transaction completed on April 13, 2015. The chronology proved significant because every milestone in Tabung Haji's investment approval sequence—spanning from the Investment Panel's July 24 endorsement through to the ministerial sign-off on August 27, 2014, and the subsequent December 3 agreement—fell squarely within this period of alleged influence.
Amir Hamzah emphasised that while these facts emerged from courtroom testimony, the judicial system had not yet determined whether Jho Low constituted the beneficial owner of Putrajaya Perdana during that timeframe. Nevertheless, the alignment of dates raised uncomfortable questions about whether Tabung Haji's management possessed complete knowledge of the company's actual ownership structure when proceeding with the transaction. A 2023 fact-finding assessment revealed that the Investment Panel had specifically requested management identify the ultimate shareholder of the seller, but the record contained no evidence that management ever provided this information. Despite this critical gap in due diligence, the transaction moved forward unimpeded.
The financial mechanics of the deal presented additional puzzles. Tabung Haji ultimately disbursed RM193.5 million to acquire its stake, based on two critical promises: that Putrajaya Perdana would achieve a public listing within twelve months and generate RM86 million in profits during 2015. Both assurances proved hollow. The pilgrim fund's own Research Division had initially expressed scepticism about the valuation, estimating the 30 per cent stake should be worth between RM124 million and RM155 million—considerably below the eventual purchase price of RM193.5 million. Notably, no written justification was ever furnished for the valuation increase or for the simultaneous elevation of the stake from 25 per cent to 30 per cent. Furthermore, the due diligence investigation occurred only after all approvals had been obtained and signed—a reversal of prudent institutional practice that meant neither the Investment Panel nor the board of directors ever reviewed these critical findings before committing the fund.
The transaction's history raised troubling questions about pricing. The seller had originally acquired Putrajaya Perdana's entire equity stake for RM260 million in 2012, implying a value of roughly RM78 million for a 30 per cent stake. Within just two years, Tabung Haji agreed to pay RM193.5 million for the same proportion—nearly two and a half times the 2012 valuation. This dramatic appreciation appeared disconnected from any disclosed improvements in the company's operational or financial standing. The seller in this transaction was Cendana Destini Sdn Bhd, an investment vehicle controlled by Rosman Abdullah, who had himself purchased control of the construction company from entities linked to Jho Low a year earlier.
Another institutional shortcoming compounded the investment's troubles. The Royal Commission of Inquiry noted that the then-chairman of Tabung Haji simultaneously held the chairmanship of Putrajaya Perdana, creating an obvious conflict of interest that was never openly disclosed or addressed during the approval process. This dual role meant the same individual theoretically juggled obligations to both the pilgrim fund and the target company—a structural problem that should have triggered heightened scrutiny rather than proceeding through routine approvals.
When the promised returns failed to materialise, Tabung Haji attempted damage control. In March 2018, the fund exercised a contractual put option, demanding that the seller repurchase the shares for RM210.7 million. The seller refused payment. The pilgrim fund subsequently wrote off the entire investment, recognising the RM193.5 million as fully impaired by the 2024 financial year. This loss of nearly two hundred million ringgit directly affected beneficiaries' returns, as the fund's assets form the corpus from which pilgrimage costs and distributions are calculated.
The Parliament discussion gained urgency when Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman, Member for Muar, raised specific concerns about the deployment of depositors' funds into a vehicle with documented links to Jho Low. SRC International, through which the suspicious funding flowed, was itself revealed in separate investigations to be a former 1Malaysia Development Bhd subsidiary that allegedly operated under Jho Low's hidden control. The connection between the two entities—SRC International and Utama Banking Group—provided the documentary thread linking the funds flowing into Putrajaya Perdana to the broader web of allegedly misused public money.
Currently, Tabung Haji is pursuing a civil claim to recover losses from the transaction. A writ has been filed, and courts have granted a Mareva injunction to prevent the defendant from moving assets beyond reach. Court-supervised mediation sessions were scheduled, though prospects for settlement appeared remote given the fundamental dispute over payment obligations. The actual trial is not expected to commence until June 23, 2027—nearly thirteen years after the initial investment decision and an extraordinarily lengthy period for Tabung Haji's contributors to have capital tied up in unresolved litigation.
For Malaysian readers and regional observers, this episode illustrated how large institutional investments could proceed despite fundamental governance failures and incomplete information about counterparty ownership. The Tabung Haji case demonstrated that approval processes, once initiated, possessed powerful momentum that continued even when investment panels explicitly requested but never received critical information about beneficial ownership. The situation also underscored how conflicts of interest—such as executives holding dual chairman positions—could escape notice or challenge during institutional decision-making cycles. For a fund managing sacred obligations to millions of Malaysian Muslim pilgrims, the RM193.5 million loss represented not merely a financial failure but a breach of fiduciary trust that would require years of litigation to potentially resolve.
