Thailand and Cambodia have taken a significant procedural step towards resolving their longstanding maritime dispute by agreeing to establish a conciliation commission under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, yet fundamental disagreements over the scope of talks threaten to complicate what should be a technical process for defining sea boundaries. Both nations have appointed independent conciliators and are working to select a neutral chairperson, pushing back an initial deadline of July 19 to August 14 to find a mutually agreeable candidate. This deliberate pace reflects the complexity beneath the surface: while Bangkok wants to focus narrowly on establishing maritime boundaries, Phnom Penh is pushing for simultaneous discussion of how the two countries would develop and share offshore oil and gas resources.
The conciliation mechanism itself is not a courtroom process that will produce binding judgments. Rather, the five-member commission—composed of four appointed conciliators plus their jointly selected chair—will examine the competing claims, study relevant maritime law, and submit recommendations that both countries would then need to negotiate into a final agreement. This approach mirrors the successful Timor-Leste-Australia conciliation that led to a treaty defining permanent maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea. Thailand has selected Rüdiger Wolfrum, a German jurist who served as president of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea from 2005 to 2008, and South African counterpart Albert J. Hoffmann, who held the same position from 2020 to 2023. Cambodia's selections include Peter Taksøe-Jensen, a Danish diplomat who chaired the Timor-Leste-Australia conciliation, and Jean-Marc Thouvenin, a French expert in international law, bringing substantial expertise to the table.
The disputed waters in question stretch across 26,000 to 27,000 square kilometres of the Gulf of Thailand and contain estimated reserves of between 11 trillion and 12 trillion cubic feet of natural gas alongside significant oil deposits—resources some analysts have valued at approximately US$300 billion. These figures explain why Cambodia has become increasingly vocal about resolving the boundary question quickly. The nation's government views the maritime conciliation not merely as a boundary-setting exercise but as a pathway to unlock joint development of these resources. Cambodian Minister of Mines and Energy Keo Rottanak has warned that the global energy landscape is shifting rapidly, with investment windows narrowing. He pointed out that major international energy companies understand time is working against fossil fuel development, meaning that if Thailand and Cambodia delay resolving their claims, financing for exploration and exploitation may simply evaporate within years.
Cambodia's urgency reflects genuine structural vulnerabilities in its energy sector. The country currently depends heavily on hydropower and increasingly on solar capacity, but its government views additional fossil fuel resources as essential for long-term industrial expansion. The global energy shocks emanating from Middle East tensions and disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz have sharpened official thinking about energy security in Phnom Penh. Cambodia views resolved maritime boundaries as the prerequisite for attracting the international capital and technical expertise required for offshore petroleum development. Major energy firms such as TotalEnergies have shown historical interest in the Gulf of Thailand, though no company has committed to specific investment plans pending boundary resolution.
Thailand's position stands in sharp contrast. Bangkok insists that the conciliation commission's mandate should be restricted strictly to establishing maritime boundaries and defining the continental shelf between the two nations. Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow has argued that discussions about joint development areas or resource-sharing arrangements would be premature before the boundary itself has been clearly established through legal and geographical analysis. The Thai government emphasises that sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national interests must remain paramount throughout any negotiation, with the implication that resource-sharing cannot be discussed until Bangkok has certainty about which waters fall within its jurisdiction.
This fundamental divergence in objectives creates a procedural dilemma. The conciliation commission will be tasked with examining the maritime dispute and considering approaches consistent with international and maritime law, but neither party can compel the other to address matters beyond boundary delimitation. Cambodia wants the commission to facilitate discussions of resource development frameworks, while Thailand wants it to function as a strictly technical mechanism for drawing lines on maps. The process is generally expected to take about twelve months, though the two countries may extend the timeline if further discussions prove necessary. Whatever emerges will require agreement between Bangkok and Phnom Penh—the commission's recommendations are merely advisory, not binding.
For Southeast Asia, this dispute carries implications beyond the two nations directly involved. A successful conciliation would demonstrate that regional states can resolve overlapping maritime claims through patient, institutionalised dialogue rather than confrontation. The Timor Sea precedent is instructive: that conciliation led to a permanent boundary treaty, proving the mechanism can produce durable outcomes. Conversely, if Thailand and Cambodia become deadlocked over scope—with one side demanding narrow focus on boundaries while the other pushes for resource discussions—the process could stall or collapse, leaving the dispute unresolved and the enormous energy resources untapped. For Malaysia and other Southeast Asian nations with their own maritime disputes, the Thailand-Cambodia experience will serve as either a cautionary tale or a model.
The appointment of seasoned maritime law experts to the conciliation commission suggests both countries are serious about achieving results. Wolfrum and Hoffmann bring decades of experience from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, while Taksøe-Jensen's role in the Timor precedent means the commission will benefit from direct familiarity with what has worked in similar circumstances. However, expertise alone cannot bridge the substantive disagreement about what the commission should accomplish. Taksøe-Jensen's previous role heightens Cambodia's hopes that he will push for inclusivity of resource-sharing discussions, just as the Timor conciliation ultimately facilitated broader discussions beyond simple boundary lines.
Thailand has appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow as its official agent in the proceedings, with Ambassador Songchai Chaipatiyut serving as deputy. This high-level assignment signals Bangkok's commitment to the process while also ensuring policy consistency with Thailand's broader strategic interests. Cambodia has not publicly announced its equivalent representatives, but the composition of its conciliator team indicates the ministry of foreign affairs is driving the initiative. The extension of the chairperson selection deadline to August 14 provides room for diplomatic negotiations behind the scenes, with both countries likely using the extra weeks to test whether compromise on scope is possible before formal procedures begin.
For observers across Southeast Asia, the key question is whether Cambodia's energy urgency will outweigh Thailand's caution, or whether the conciliation process itself can create conditions for both concerns to be addressed. The Timor precedent suggests phased approaches are possible: boundary definition might proceed first, with resource-sharing mechanisms discussed after maritime jurisdiction becomes clear. Yet achieving such sequencing requires mutual trust and strategic patience from both capitals. If either side perceives the other as using the conciliation process to advance hidden agendas—whether locking in unfavourable boundaries or securing premature resource rights—confidence will erode. The coming weeks of chairperson negotiations will reveal whether Bangkok and Phnom Penh can find common ground on the commission's fundamental purpose.
